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TARGETED KILLINGS BY DRONES: 
A DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK 
 
Catherine Lotrionte
*
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In the last couple of decades, the threat from transnational 
terrorist organizations has prompted many States to reevaluate how 
international and domestic laws can effectively operate to counter 
these threats.  Although terrorists have conducted violent acts for 
centuries, it has only been since the early 1990s that terrorist 
groups such as Al Qaeda (“Al Qaeda”) have been effective in 
extending their span of operations globally and continuously.  With 
the global reach of such groups, they have successfully threatened 
the fundamental security of States with a magnitude of violence 
never envisioned by the drafters of the legal instruments that guide 
State behavior in this area.  Today, States struggle to reevaluate 
how these laws are applicable to this new category of enemy.  This 
article examines the relevant domestic and international legal 
framework for countering the modern threats from terrorism, 
focusing on the U.S. drone program as one tactical tool to counter 
terrorists. 
 
 As armed drones fly through the skies, seeking out their 
targets, they are tasked to kill those enemies that are actively 
engaged in warfare against the United States.  The drones are 
tasked to target and kill the enemy.  Their function is generally 
described as “targeted killings.”  Despite the frequency of the use 
of the term “targeted killings,” such term is not defined in U.S. or 
international law.  This article adopts the definition provided by 
the United Nations Human Rights Council (“UNHRC”); 
accordingly, a targeted killing is “the intentional, premeditated and 
deliberate use of lethal force by States or their agents under the 
color of law, or by an organized armed group in armed conflict, 
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against a specific individual who is not in the physical custody of 
the perpetrator.”1  Targeted killings are distinguishable from 
assassinations or extrajudicial killings, terms often used 
interchangeably.  While targeted killings can be legal depending on 
the circumstances of each case, extrajudicial killings and 
assassinations are never legal.  The legality of a specific targeted 
killing depends on the context in which it is conducted, whether in 
self-defense, during armed conflict, or outside of armed conflict.  
  
 Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States 
has been engaged in a declared armed conflict with members of Al 
Qaeda, a terrorist organization.  The genesis of the conflict dates 
back to the early 1990s.  In 1991, Al Qaeda targeted American 
soldiers in Somalia.  In 1993, the organization tried to take down 
the World Trade Center by detonating a bomb in a basement 
garage.  In 1998, it carried out coordinated attacks on two U.S. 
embassies in East Africa.  And in 2000, Al Qaeda attempted to 
sink the U.S.S. Cole, a U.S. Navy destroyer ship, ripping a hole 
into the ship’s hull, resulting in the deaths of 17 U.S. servicemen.  
These are some of the successful attacks by Al Qaeda that predated 
the 9/11 attacks, not including those attacks that were thwarted or 
failed.  Post-9/11, Al Qaeda and its affiliates continue to seek to 
bring violence to Americans.  Fortunately, many attempts have 
been prevented largely due to the U.S. counterterrorism strategy.   
U.S. counterterrorism strategy seeks to deprive terrorists of any 
safe haven from which to operate; in the process, the United States 
has killed thousands of operatives, captured or killed two thirds of 
their leadership, and destroyed bases in Afghanistan.
2
  Still, Al 
                                                        
1
 Philip Alston, Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or 
Arbitrary Executions, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, 
Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Addendum, Study on Targeted Killings, ¶ 24, 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010); NILS MELZER, TARGETED 
KILLING IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 (2009) (“the use of lethal force attributable 
to a subject of international law with the intent, premeditation and deliberation 
to kill individually selected persons who are not in the physical custody of those 
targeting them.”). 
2
 Paul R. Pillar, Counterterrorism After Al Qaeda, 27 WASH. Q. 101, 101–
02 (2004), available at 
http://www.twq.com/04summer/docs/04summer_pillar.pdf.  
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Qaeda continues to plan and carry out new terrorist attacks, 
extending its reach in places like London, Madrid, and Bali. 
 
 The reality is that since the early 1990s, the United States 
has been in conflict with a violent group. Al Qaeda and its 
affiliates continue to infiltrate the United States, attack the United 
States, kill Americans, and seek to overthrow the nation with a 
level of sophistication and magnitude that previously only States 
could command.  Until 9/11, however, the United States chose to 
address these threats as criminal acts by a gang of bandits (with a 
few rare exceptions that will be discussed below), seeking to 
subpoena, capture, arrest, try and convict them.  The theory was 
that the criminal justice system could function as a weapon of 
deterrence against terrorists, preventing further attacks.  After 9/11, 
however, recognizing the real limitations of the criminal system as 
a counterterrorism tool, the United States acted swiftly, using 
lethal force to stop and prevent the on-going terrorist attacks that 
had threatened the United States for a decade.   
 
 The legal justification to use force, including targeted 
killings, against Al Qaeda, the Taliban and associated forces has 
been stated by the U.S. government as twofold: self-defense and 
the laws of armed conflict.
3
  The targets are those terrorists who 
have already conducted armed attacks against the United States or 
are in the process of planning such attacks.  These targets pose a 
threat to the national security of the United States.  They are either 
members of Al Qaeda, the group that conducted the 9/11 attacks, 
the Taliban, the group that assisted Al Qaeda, groups that have 
partnered with Al Qaeda since 9/11 to pursue the same objectives 
of attacking the United States, or individuals who are directly 
supporting these terrorists in conducting attacks.  The critical 
element of analysis is that each individual targeted to be killed by a 
drone poses a real, current or anticipated threat, as assessed by the 
U.S. military or intelligence professionals.   
 
                                                        
3
 Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State, Speech before 
the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law (Mar. 25, 
2010), available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm.  
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 While the use of armed drones to kill terrorists may be a 
new technology only deployed by the United States after 9/11, as a 
recent report by the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence stated, 
“Most of the legal issues surrounding the use of existing and 
planned systems are well understood and are simply a variation of 
those associated with manned systems.”4  In terms of both the U.S. 
domestic legal framework as well as the international legal 
framework, the use of lethal force in self-defense against threats 
(past, present and anticipated) has been well established in codified 
legal rules (the U.S. Constitution, statutes, treaties) and in 
customary law based on policies and practices of the majority of 
States.  Certainly, all States maintain the domestic legal authority 
to act in self-defense when faced by threats that challenge the 
national security of the State.  International law has affirmatively 
supported that authority, allowing States to use force to defend 
against those greatest kinds of threats.  Furthermore, since at least 
the signing of the Geneva Conventions, and previously through 
custom, the authority to engage in self-defense and armed conflict 
is not unlimited.  Rather, international law has established rules for 
those acting in self-defense and those engaged in armed hostilities.  
This article examines how these rules apply to the U.S. drone 
program. 
 
I. U.S. TARGETED KILLINGS: ARTICULATING THE “UNWILLING AND 
UNABLE” TEST 
 
Less than a week after the terrorist attacks against the 
United States on 9/11, President Bush signed a secret order 
authorizing the Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”) to use armed 
drones to kill members of Al Qaeda as well as members of the 
                                                        
4
 U.K. Ministry of Defence, Joint Doctrine Note 2/11, The UK Approach 
to Unmanned Aircraft Systems 502 (Mar. 30, 2011), available at 
http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdpnlyres/F9335CB2-73FC-4761-A428-
DB7DF4BEC02C/0/20110505JDN_211_UAS_v2U.pdf (citing Tony Gillespie 
& Robin West, Requirements of Autonomous Unmanned Air Systems Set by 
Legal Issues, DEF. SCI. & TECH. LAB., Dec. 14, 2010, 
http://www.dodccrp.org/html4/journal_v4n2.html).  
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Taliban and other associated forces in the territory of other States.
5
  
On November 4, 2002, an unmanned Predator drone, controlled by 
the CIA, fired a Hellfire missile at a car in the desert outside the 
Yemeni capital of Sana’a.  The target, Abu Ali al-Harithi, Al 
Qaeda’s senior leader in Yemen and one of the planners of the 
attack on the U.S.S. Cole in 2000.
6
  The collateral damage 
included an American citizen, Kamal Derwish, who was reported 
to be the leader of an Al Qaeda cell operating in Lackawanna, New 
York.  Although the drones had been used before to target and kill 
enemy combatants, the strike against al-Harithi was the first one 
conducted outside of Afghanistan, the well-recognized zone of 
hostilities after 9/11.  The United Nations Commission on Human 
Rights (“UNCHR”) called the killing of al-Harithi “a clear case of 
extrajudicial killing,” terms the United States would hear repeated 
numerous times over the next decade.
7
  The al-Harithi strike was 
also the first confirmed killing of an American citizen by a drone 
strike, although it does not appear that the American was the target 
but, rather, was “collateral” damage or, in intelligence parlance, 
“incidental.” 
 
Since 2002, drone strikes have been used frequently outside 
of Afghanistan.  There have been a number of high-profile killings 
of Al Qaeda and Taliban leaders outside of Afghanistan, including 
the May 2005 killing of Haitham al-Yemeni and August 2009 
killing of Baitullah Mehsud, both in Pakistan.
8
  The legality of the 
drone strikes outside of Afghanistan has been questioned by some 
                                                        
5
 See BOB WOODWARD, BUSH AT WAR 101 (2002); see also Jane Mayer, 
The Predator War, NEW YORKER, Oct. 26, 2009.  
6
 David Johnston & David E. Sanger, Threats and Responses: Hunt for 
Suspects; Fatal Strike In Yemen Was Based on Rules Set Out by Bush, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 6, 2002, at A16, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/06/world/threats-responses-hunt-for-suspects-
fatal-strike-yemen-was-based-rules-set-bush.html.  
7
 Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, 
U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, ¶¶ 37–39, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/003/3 (Jan. 13, 
2003) (by Asma Jahangir), available at 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/executions/annual.htm. 
8
 Douglas Jehl, Remotely Controlled Craft Part of U.S.-Pakistan Drive 
Against Al Qaeda, Ex-Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2005, at A12, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/16/politics/16qaeda.html.  
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who argue that any killings outside the zone of armed conflict, 
Afghanistan, would constitute illegal killings in violation of the 
victims’ human rights.9  Since 9/11, drone strikes have been 
carried out in Afghanistan, Syria, Yemen, Pakistan, and Somalia 
by both the CIA and the U.S. military, sometimes separately and at 
other times as joint operations.  The recent terrorist attack against 
the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi, Libya, on September 11, 2012, 
which killed U.S. Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens and three 
other Americans, has raised the issue of whether the CIA will 
begin using armed drones in North Africa targeting the Al Qaeda 
affiliate group known as Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.
10
  The 
group has been linked to the attack and has declared its intention to 
attack U.S. targets.  North Africa may be the next region where the 
drone program could be employed.   
 
Since the incidental killing of Derwish in 2002, the United 
States has confirmed that armed drones killed an American citizen, 
Anwar al-Awlaki, an American Muslim cleric who helped plan a 
number of terrorist plots, including the December 2009 attempt to 
blow up a jetliner headed to Detroit.  Al-Awlaki had served as a 
recruiter for Al Qaeda and had links to Major Nidal Hasan, who 
attacked fellow soldiers at Fort Hood, Texas in 2009.  In 
September 2011, the CIA targeted and killed al-Awlaki while he 
was traveling in Yemen. This was the first time since killing 
Hairithi in Yemen in 2002 that the CIA conducted a drone targeted 
killing inside Yemen.  The case of Awlaki and other similar cases 
since 9/11 highlight that Al Qaeda remains a lethal enemy of the 
United States, especially given its ability to find sanctuary in other 
territories.  As specific Al Qaeda members have been successfully 
eliminated, the group has come to rely on affiliate organizations 
dispersed across several continents (Al Qaeda in the Arabian 
Peninsula, al-Shabab in Somalia, Lashkar-e-Taiba in Pakistan, the 
                                                        
9
 Mary Ellen O’Connell, Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones: A Case 
Study of Pakistan, 2–4 (Legal Studies Research Paper No. 09-43, Notre Dame 
Law Sch., July 2010).  
10
 Greg Miller, CIA Seeks to Expand Drone Fleet, Officials Say,” WASH. 
POST, Oct. 18, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/cia-seeks-to-expand-drone-fleet-officials-say/2012/10/18/01149a8c-
1949-11e2-bd10-5ff056538b7c_story.html.  
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Haqqani network in Pakistan, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb).  
These affiliates are now the extension of Al Qaeda operating under 
the same goals and mission.  They provide financial, technical, and 
logistical support functions to those local franchises of Al Qaeda in 
different countries. On September 30, 2011, President Obama 
publicity identified al-Awlaki as “the leader of external operations 
for Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.”  He had played a 
significant role in an attack conducted by Umar Farouk 
Abdulmutallab, the Nigerian Muslim who attempted to blow up a 
Northwest Airlines flight bound for Detroit on Christmas Day 
2009.
11
 Al-Awlaki’s work for Al Qaeda started with just 
encouraging terrorist activities against the United States but he 
then transitioned to “acting for or on behalf of Al Qaeda in the 
Arabian Peninsula . . . and providing financial, material or 
technical support for . . . acts of terrorism.”12  He had become a 
belligerent and, according to U.S. officials, a legitimate target.  
Also killed in the drone strike was Samir Khan, publisher of the 
Inspire, and an American citizen who was not on the target list but 
was traveling with al-Awlaki.   
 
The targeting of al-Awlaki, an American citizen, caused a 
significant level of concern among U.S. government officials about 
the legality of the president authorizing the killing of an American 
citizen in secret and without the benefit of a trial.  In response to 
concerns raised, the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel 
was asked to draft a special memorandum justifying the killing and 
providing a legal rationale for targeting an American.
13
  According 
to the New York Times, the memo asserted that the targeted killing 
of al-Awlaki would not violate the U.S. Constitution, Executive 
Order 12333 and its ban on assassinations, any U.S. criminal 
                                                        
11
 Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction and 
Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 8, Al-Aulaqi v. 
Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010) (No. 10-cv-01469) (quoting Michael 
Leiter, Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, before the Senate 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee on Sept. 22, 2010). 
12
 Designation of Anwar Al-Aulaqi [as a Specially Designated Global 
Terrorist] pursuant to Exec. Order 13224 and the Global Terrorism Sanctions 
Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 594, 75 Fed. Reg. 43233, 43234 (July 23, 2010). 
13
 Charlie Savage, Secret U.S. Memo Made Legal Case to Kill a Citizen, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2011, at 1. 
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statute on murder, or international law.
14
  According to the article, 
the administration had determined that since al-Awlaki’s capture 
was not feasible and Yemeni authorities were unable or unwilling 
to prevent his participation in activities that posed a threat to the 
United States, the killing of al-Awlaki was necessary and lawful.
15
 
   
On March 5, 2012, in a speech at Northwestern University 
School of Law, Attorney General Eric Holder reiterated the 
“unwilling or unable” test as he described that targeted killings in 
other countries would be legal if the host State “is unable or 
unwilling to deal effectively with a threat to the United States.”16  
In addressing the issue of targeting U.S. citizens, Holder outlined 
the circumstances under which lethal force would be lawful, to 
include the criteria that the individual was 1) a senior operational 
leader of a group the United States was engaged in armed conflict 
with, and 2)  actively engaged in planning to kill Americans.  
Notably, also included in this list of factors was the requirement 
that the U.S. citizen posed “an imminent threat of violent attack 
against the United States,” an element not traditionally required for 
legitimate targets under the laws of armed conflict.
17
   
 
This was not the first time that the United States has 
articulated the “unwilling or unable” test to justify actions in 
another State’s territory without the State’s consent.  The United 
States has articulated the same test in uses of force in addition to 
                                                        
14
 Id.  
15
 Id.  
16
 Attorney General Eric Holder, Speech at Northwestern University 
School of Law (Mar. 5, 2012), available at 
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/03/2012/text-of-the-attorney-generals-
national-security-speech/#more-6236.  
17
 Id.  It is interesting to note that under jus in bello principles in 
international law, there is no requirement to make individual determinations 
about targets that involve an imminent threat.  Furthermore, under jus ad bellum, 
according to the Caroline precedent (addressed below), the imminent criteria is 
only necessary when acting in self-defense when the host State is actually 
willing to cooperate in deterring the threat but the threatened State determines 
that it must act swiftly without the host State’s assistance in preventing a threat 
from materializing.  It is not clear why the U.S. administration has added an 
additional element of “imminence” for targeting U.S. citizens. 
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the use of drones.  In 2008, as President Obama was campaigning 
for the presidential election, in addressing how he would address 
the terrorist threat emerging from Pakistan, he stated, “[I]f we have 
actionable intelligence against bin Laden or other key Al Qaeda 
officials . . . and Pakistan is unwilling or unable to strike against 
them, we should.”18  In May 2010, with President Obama in the 
Oval Office, the United States did just that.  By President Obama’s 
order, U.S. Navy Seals entered Pakistan, with the government’s 
consent, and killed Osama bin Laden.  The implication from the 
U.S. action was that the United States had determined that Pakistan 
was either unable or unwilling to deal with Osama bin Laden (stop 
him from planning further attacks on the United States).  
Therefore, the United States would address the threat even if that 
meant violating Pakistan’s sovereignty. 
 
 President Obama referenced an “unwilling or unable” 
standard in using force within Pakistan for the operation against 
Osama bin Laden.  Other States agree that a standard like the 
“unwilling or unable” test is the appropriate standard to assess the 
legality of the use of force under the circumstances.
19
 Many 
commentators have debated whether the U.S. operation in this case 
was lawful under international law.  Unfortunately, international 
law currently gives States like the United States that are suffering 
from ongoing attacks from non-state actors little direction about 
what factors are relevant under the law when making these 
decisions.   
 
 A year after killing Osama Bin Laden, the Obama 
administration, for the first time, acknowledged the U.S. covert 
program using drones to kill terrorists.  In a speech at the 
Woodrow Wilson Center, John Brennan, the President’s 
                                                        
18
 Andy Merten, Presidential Candidates Debate Pakistan, MSNBC, Feb. 
28, 2008. 
19
 U.N. Security Council, 36th Sess., 2292nd mtg. at 5, U.N. Doc. 
S/PV.2292 (July 17, 1981) (Israel invoking the “unwilling or unable” standard 
in justifying its use of force in Lebanon against Hezbollah); U.N. Doc. 
S/1996/479 (July 2, 1996) (in a letter from its Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Turkey invokes the “unwilling or unable” test to defend its use of force in Iraq 
against the Kurdish Workers’ Party).   
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counterterrorism advisor at the White House, provided the first 
official disclosure of the secret program, discussing the legal 
standard for the targeted killings.
20
  Brennan stated the president 
has general constitutional authority as commander in chief to act 
against “any imminent threat of attack” and a specific 
congressional mandate to strike any member of Al Qaeda under the 
2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force. But with Al Qaeda 
members, Brennan goes on, “when considering lethal force we ask 
whether the individual poses a significant threat to U.S. interests.” 
Except when the Al Qaeda member is a U.S. citizen; then the 
standard narrows to “whether the individual poses an imminent 
threat of violent attack.”  It seems that Brennan drew a distinction 
between a lower threshold for designating a foreign member of Al 
Qaeda a lawful target, a determination by the U.S. government that 
the individual is a “significant threat” and a higher threshold for 
American citizens who are members of Al Qaeda to become a 
target, a determination that the American poses an imminent threat 
of violent attack.  
 
 Brennan also discussed the issue of international legal 
authority.  Invoking the same “unable or unwilling” language that 
President Obama had previously used, Brennan argued that based 
on the self-defense principle of international law, the drone attacks 
into another State’s sovereignty territory are legal, “at least when 
the country involved consents or is unable or unwilling to take 
action against the threat.”21  In addition to Pakistan not providing 
its consent to the United States to kill Osama bin Laden within 
Pakistan, there is evidence that Pakistan has also objected to the 
U.S. use of drones to conduct targeted killings within Pakistan.  
                                                        
20
 John O. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and 
Counterterrorism, Remarks at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for 
Scholars: Ethics and Efficacy of the President’s Counterterrorism Strategy (Apr. 
30, 2012), available at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/the-efficacy-and-
ethics-U.S.-counterterrorism-strategy.  
21
 Id.  See also John O. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland 
Security and Counterterrorism, Remarks at Harvard Law School’s Program on 
Law and Security: Strengthening Our Security By Adhering To Our Values And 
Laws (Sept. 16, 2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2011/09/16/remarks-john-o-brennan-strengthening-our-security-adhering-
our-values-an.  
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Reading between the lines of the administration’s statements, its 
legal argument for lawful strikes within Pakistan, even without 
consent, is based on the idea that if a State is unable or unwilling to 
stop its territory from being used by individuals cause harm to the 
United States, then the United States will act to eliminate the threat 
based upon its right of self-defense.  In other words, while the 
United States will not hold the government of Pakistan responsible 
necessarily (i.e., the United States is not attacking elements of the 
Pakistan government but only the terrorist target), it will invoke its 
right of self-defense to prevent or stop the threat, even if it means 
violating the sovereignty of Pakistan. 
  
Understanding the basis of such tests under international 
law is important to assessing the legality and legitimacy of State 
actions.  This article will review the international law related to the 
use of force, looking to relevant factors such as treaty law, 
decisions of international courts and the opinions of legal scholars 
in discussing the legality of the use of force.  First, however, the 
next section will examine the use of drones under U.S. domestic 
law. 
II. U.S. DOMESTIC LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Some critics of the U.S. drone program have argued that 
the Bush and Obama administrations use of armed drones to kill 
specific individuals violates domestic law.  They have challenged 
the authorities of specific agencies conducting the targeted killings 
as well as the overall presidential authorities to kill individuals 
without affording them trials.  The legal authorities of U.S. 
military and intelligence agencies to use drones to target and kill 
terrorists starts with the presidential executive and commander-in-
chief powers, delineated in the U.S. Constitution and applicable 
federal statutes, and delegated to the Secretary of Defense under 
his authorities pursuant to Title 10 of the U.S. Code and the 
Director of National Intelligence (“DNI”) and Director of the 
Central Intelligence Agency (“DCIA”) pursuant to their authorities 
as outlined in Title 50 of the U.S. Code.  
 
 The U.S. President’s authority to direct military and 
intelligence activities against foreign threats resides in his 
30     ST. JOHN’S JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL [Vol. 3 No. 1 
                          & COMPARATIVE LAW 
 
constitutional executive and commander-in-chief powers.
22
  As the 
Supreme Court noted in the Curtiss-Wright case, the president is 
vested with significant executive power and is the “sole organ of 
the federal government in the field of international relations—a 
power which does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of 
Congress.”23  The dispute in the Curtiss-Wright case was whether 
President Roosevelt had independent authority to restrict private 
companies in shipping arms overseas because the president 
deemed such sales to be threatening to U.S. national security.  In 
finding that the president was acting under his constitutionally 
provided powers of commander-in-chief in that case, the Court 
ruled that the president did not need congressional permission to 
restrict such shipments, as he was carrying out his responsibility to 
defend the nation from foreign threats.
24
 
 
 Similarly, the Court has found that the president’s 
commander-in-chief constitutional authorities authorize him “to 
employ secret agents to enter rebel lines and obtain information 
respecting the strengths, resources, and movements of the 
enemy.”25  As recognized by those that drafted the U.S. 
Constitution, the president has the authority to “manage the 
business of intelligence in such a manner as prudence may 
dictate.”26  While some disagree as to how such powers are to be 
shared between Congress and the Executive Branch, no one 
disputes the president’s authority to use both military and 
intelligence measures to repel attacks against the nation.
27
  
Certainly, if the country is at risk of attack, actual or anticipated, 
the president, through those authorities vested to him in the U.S. 
Constitution has the authority to act in defense of the nation in 
accordance with the relevant domestic and international laws.   
                                                        
22
 U.S. CONSTITUTION, art. II.  
23
 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).   
24
 Id.  
25
 Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 106 (1876). 
26
 THE FEDERALIST NO. 64 (John Jay). 
27
 JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS 
OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH, 3-5 (1993); LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL 
WAR POWERS 3–12  (1995); MICHAEL GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 
80–84 (1990); HAROLD H. KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: 
SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 74–77 (1990). 
                 TARGETED KILLINGS BY DRONES:                        31 
A DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
 As commander-in-chief, the president can exercise his 
authority through any agency or department that he believes will 
be most effective in defending the nation, as long as such action is 
also in accordance with statutory enactments by Congress.  Title 
10 and Title 50 of the U.S. Code are the relevant U.S. statutes 
outlining the president’s authority to use the military and/or 
intelligence agencies to employ force against threats.  Under Title 
10, the secretary of defense is the president’s “principal assistant . . 
. in all matters relating to the U.S. Department of Defense 
(“DoD”).”28  This statute provides to the secretary of defense the 
“authority, direction and control” over the DoD, to include all 
agencies and commands within the department.
29
  Title 50 of the 
U.S. Code incorporates the National Security Act of 1947 which 
established the National Security Council (“NSC”), the CIA, as 
well as other agencies, and codified the process for national 
security decision-making and congressional oversight of 
intelligence activities.
30
  In addition to creating specific national 
security agencies, Title 50 establishes, defines and delineates the 
authorities within the intelligence community.
31
  As contrasted 
with the DoD’s war-fighting authorities under Title 10, CIA’s 
covert action authorities are derived from Title 50, to be discussed 
later in this article.   
 
 Title 10 and Title 50 statutes are mutually-reinforcing 
authorities in that nothing within the statutes prohibits the DoD 
elements from carrying out activities under Title 50 authorities 
(i.e., the operation to kill Osama Bin Laden) and nothing within the 
statutes prohibits intelligence elements from operating under Title 
50 authorities.  During the May 2011 U.S. operation against Bin 
Laden in Pakistan, for example, U.S. military assets, Navy Seals, 
executed the operation, but they did so under the authority of the 
then-DCIA Leon Panetta.  Director Panetta was operating under 
                                                        
28
 10 U.S.C. § 113(b) (2006). 
29
 Id. 
30
 50 U.S.C. § 1-2420 (2006). 
31
 50 U.S.C. § 403-5 (2006).  The National Geo-Spatial Agency (“NGA”) 
and the National Reconnaissance Office (“NRO”) are also intelligence agencies 
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his authorities as delegated by the president and pursuant to the 
National Security Act of 1947 to conduct covert action.  Notably, 
operational responsibility for conducting covert action remains 
with the CIA and not the DNI.  In accordance with the Intelligence 
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (“IRTPA”), 
legislation that reorganized the intelligence community in the 
aftermath of 9/11, the DCIA reports to the DNI, but the DNI does 
not have operational control over the CIA.
32
  The vague language 
within the statute has caused some tension between the DNI and 
the DCIA related to operational matters and the line between their 
authorities.  There had been disagreements over the respective 
roles of the DNI and DCIA related to covert action that were 
ultimately resolved by the National Security Council.  The 
resolution was that the CIA would remain in charge of covert 
action and the right to select chiefs of stations and the DNI was 
given a role in assessing and evaluating covert action when 
requested by the president or the NSC. 
 
 Much of the debate and concern over the conflating of the 
two statutory authorities within Title 10 and Title 50 has to do with 
congressional oversight and reporting requirements.  Some have 
argued that by calling some activities “preparation of the 
environment,” under its Title 10 authorities, DoD avoids reporting 
those activities to the congressional oversight committees that 
would otherwise be informed of such activities if conducted by 
CIA under its Title 50 authorities.
33
  There are, however, important 
implications related to oversight, especially when the government 
is engaged in authorizing the killing of American citizens.  It is 
important to ensure that appropriate transparency exists related to 
the president’s actions in the name of national defense. 
 
                                                        
32
 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (“IRTPA”), 
Pub. L. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638, enacted Dec. 17, 2004.  
33
 Jeffrey H. Smith, Keynote Address: Symposium: State Intelligence 
Gathering and International Law, 28 MICH. J. INT’L L. 543, 546–47 (2007) 
(former CIA General Counsel Jeff Smith describes the different notification 
requirements for DoD and CIA for activities that would appear to be the same 
types of activities but conducted by a different organization of the U.S. 
government). 
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 Oversight over DoD activities is conducted by both the 
Senate and House Armed Services Committees, which exercise 
jurisdiction over all aspects of DoD and matters relating to “the 
common defense.”34  As for congressional oversight of intelligence 
activities, the National Security Act of 1947 originally did not 
include any congressional oversight provisions and any oversight 
at the time that was conducted was done in an informal and 
minimal fashion.  This approach to intelligence oversight changed 
radically after the Church and Pike Committees conducted their 
investigations in the early 1970s over allegations of domestic 
spying and assassinations plots by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigations (“FBI”), the NSA and the CIA.  Ultimately, in 1980, 
Congress passed the Intelligence Oversight Act, as part of the 
Intelligence Authorization statute for 1981, requiring the then-
DCIA to keep the congressional intelligence committees “fully and 
currently informed of all intelligence activities.”35  Today, the 
intelligence committees exercise broad oversight of the 
intelligence community. 
 
In the context of the drone programs, whether the military 
or the intelligence agencies are conducting the strikes, 
administration officials have publicly stated that they are keeping 
Congress informed of the counterterrorism operations.  In his 
speech at Northwestern School of Law in March of 2012, Attorney 
General Holder, in addressing the issue of the United States 
targeting a U.S. citizen, Holder noted that the U.S. Constitution 
does not require the president to get permission from a court before 
targeting a U.S. citizen who is engaged in a conflict against the 
United States but also noted, 
  
[I]n keeping with the law and our constitutional 
system of checks and balances, the Executive 
Branch regularly informs the appropriate members 
of Congress about our counterterrorism activities, 
                                                        
34
 S. Comm. On Rules & Admin., 111th Cong., Standing Rules of the 
Senate R. XXV, 1(c)(1) (2009); Rules of the House of Representatives, 111th 
Cong., Rule X, 1(c).  
35
 Intelligence Authorization Act for 1981, 94 Stat. 1981, Pub. L. 96-450 
(1980).  
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including the legal framework, and would of course 
follow the same practice where lethal force is used 
against United States citizens. 
 
A. Covert Action 
 
Covert action is defined in the National Security Act of 
1947 as “[a]n activity or activities of the United States Government 
to influence political, economic or military conditions abroad, 
where it is intended that the role of the United States Government 
will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly.”36  In 1974, 
Congress passed the Hughes-Ryan Amendment to the Foreign 
Assistance Act, mandating that the president make specific 
findings regarding covert actions, providing Congress with 
notification of the covert actions that the president authorized.
37
  
The president must sign an order approving the operation, based on 
the president’s finding that covert action is “necessary to support 
identifiable foreign policy objectives of the United States, and is 
important to the national security of the United States” and 
specifying the U.S. departments, agencies, or entities and any third 
parties not elements or agents of the U.S. government who are 
authorized “to fund or otherwise participate in any significant way 
in the covert action.”38  The Church Committee’s final report 
concluded that a presidential finding for each covert operation 
stating the operations were “important to the national security of 
the United States” was sufficient to ensure constraint in the use of 
covert actions.  The report stated, “covert action must be seen as an 
exceptional act, to be undertaken only when the national security 
requires it and when over means will not suffice.”39 
 
 In 1980, as part of the Intelligence Oversight Act, Congress 
imposed procedural requirements on the intelligence community 
                                                        
36
 Pub. L. No. 80-253, 61 Stat. 495.  
37
 The Hughes-Ryan Amendment, Pub. L. No. 93-559, Sec. 32, 88 Stat. 
1795, 1804 (1974) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2244 (Supp. 1975)). 
38
 Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, Pub. L. No. 192-88, 
105 Stat. 441 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 413–414, 413b(e) (2000)).  
39
 Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations 
with Respect to Intelligence Activities, S. Rep. No. 94-755, at 159–60 (1976). 
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for reporting activities to Congress.
40
  This statute required the 
president to keep the intelligence communities “fully and currently 
informed” of “significant anticipated intelligence activit[ies],” 
allowing the president to limit notification under “extraordinary 
circumstances.”41  With the congressional statutes that were passed 
during the 1980s and 1990s, Congress ended the practice of 
plausible denial for the president in conducting intelligence 
activities, at least as related to Congress.  The reporting 
requirements continue today and ensure that Congress has a role in 
reviewing all targeted killings whether they are described as covert 
actions or significant intelligence activities. In sum, the legal 
authority to conduct covert action resides in the Executive Branch, 
with congressional oversight and formal presidential approval of 
all covert programs.   
 
 Shortly after 9/11, President Bush signed a covert action 
authorizing the use of lethal force against Osama Bin Laden and 
others responsible for the attacks.
42
  In intelligence parlance, this 
document is called a “lethal finding.”  In 2010, a limited number of 
congressional leaders were informed about the Bin Laden mission 
prior to its execution.  Previously, presidents had signed similar 
findings targeting specific individuals.  It was reported that 
President Reagan signed a secret presidential finding authorizing 
the use of lethal force to kill Gaddafi prior to the United States 
bombing of his headquarters in Libya in 1984.
43
  By the end of 
1998, President Clinton had expanded his previous authorization to 
the CIA, allowing CIA tribal partners in Afghanistan to kill Bin 
Laden.
44
 
 
                                                        
40
 Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-450, section 407(b), 
94 Stat. 1981 (Oct. 14, 1980) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 413 (2000)). 
41
 Id. at § 501(a).  
42
 WOODWARD, supra note 5.  
43
 Bob Woodward & Walter Pincus, 1984 Order Gave CIA Latitude: 
Reagan’s Secret Move to Counter Terrorists Called License to Kill, WASH. 
POST, Oct. 5, 1988, at A1. 
44
 Nat’l Comm’n on Terrorist Attacks Upon the U.S., The 9/11 
Commission Report 47–70 (2004) [hereinafter 9/11 Commission Report], 
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 The Obama administration has not officially confirmed that 
the CIA is conducting drone strikes against terrorists under covert 
action authorities.  However, in February 2011, John A. Rizzo, 
former CIA Acting General Counsel, who served as the most 
senior lawyer at the CIA and retired in 2009, discussed the CIA 
covert action drone program in an interview with Newsweek.  He 
explained how he personally “concurred” on authorizations for 
drone strikes against specific targets, signing “about one cable each 
month.”45  Rizzo is currently under investigation by the 
Department of Justice for the unauthorized disclosure of CIA’s 
secret drone program based on the details he discussed in the 
interview.
46
  More recently, on April 10, 2012, while not 
confirming the CIA’s role in the drone program, Stephen W. 
Preston, General Counsel of the CIA, spoke at Harvard Law 
School, discussing CIA and the Rule of Law.
47
  In his speech, 
Preston noted that CIA activities must comport with “covert action 
procedures of the National Security Act of 1947, such that 
Congress is properly notified by means of a Presidential Finding.”  
He further mentioned that depending on the specific activities, 
“international law principles may be applicable” including the right 
of self-defense and rules related to armed conflict.  The CIA drone 
program as described would be categorized as a covert operation 
and would therefore have presidential authorization under U.S. 
domestic legal requirements.  The president, however, would not 
necessarily be knowledgeable about the identity of any specific 
individual on the CIA’s target list.  Furthermore, certain members 
of Congress would be notified about the program.  What is less 
clear is the level of detail that is provided to the members of 
                                                        
45
 Tara McKelvey, Inside the Killing Machine, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 13, 2011, 
available at http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2011/02/13/inside-the-
killing-machine.print.html.  
46
 Eli Lake, Former CIA General Counsel is in the Crosshairs in Leak 
Probe, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 10, 2011, available at 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/11/10/former-cia-general-counsel-
is-in-the-crosshairs-in-leak-probe.print.html.  
47
 Stephen W. Preston, General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, 
Address at Harvard Law School: CIA and the Rule of Law (Apr. 10, 2012), 
available at http://www.cfr.org/rule-of-law/cia-general-counsel-stephen-
prestons-remarks-rule-law-april-2012/p27912.  
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Congress and whether the Congress would be legally entitled to 
obtaining such details (i.e., do they get access to CIA’s target list).  
 
B. E.O. 12333: Assassinations v. Targeted Killings 
 
In 1975, Congress established the Senate Select Committee 
to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence 
Activities (“Church Committee”) to investigate allegations that the 
CIA had exceeded its charter.  The committee found that the CIA, 
at the direction of the White House, had been involved in several 
assassination plots in the 1960s and 1970s, the most famous one 
against Fidel Castro.
48
  There were other plots targeting Patrice 
Lumumba of the Congo, Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican 
Republic, General Rene Schneider of Chile, and Ngo Dinh Diem 
of South Vietnam.
49
  In its final report, the Church Committee 
stated, “We condemn assassination and reject it as an instrument of 
American policy.”50  Since 1976, the United States has formally 
banned the use of assassinations, either directly by the United 
States or by third parties.   
 
 In 1976, not wanting a legislative enactment that would 
impinge upon the president’s constitutional authorities as 
commander-in-chief to carry out intelligence activities, Gerald R. 
Ford issued Executive Order 11905 prohibiting assassinations as 
well as setting forth a number of other rules and procedures for the 
intelligence community to follow.
51
  Every president since 
President Ford has signed the executive order maintaining the 
assassination ban provision.  The current version, Executive Order 
12333, first signed by President Reagan in 1981 and most recently 
updated in 2008, bans assassinations.  It provides that “[n]o person 
                                                        
48
 Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, S. Rep. No. 94-
465 [hereinafter Church Committee Report]. 
49
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 U.S. Senate, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, An 
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employed by or acting on behalf of the United States Government 
shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination.”52  
Executive Order 12333 and its predecessor orders do not define the 
term “assassination.”53  However, given the context in which the 
order was originally promulgated the ban has been understood to 
apply to circumstances of killings of heads of state during a time of 
peace.
54
   
 
 Tragically, prior to 9/11, not all U.S. officials agreed with 
this interpretation of the executive order, cautioning that any 
operation to target and kill Bin Laden (versus capture and try him 
before a court) would potentially violate the executive order ban on 
assassination.
55
  Throughout the 1990s, concerns about the legal 
and political implications of targeting Bin Laden outside a self-
defense scenario prevented the CIA from taking action to eliminate 
an enemy of the United States who would continue to wage an 
effective war against the State.  Certainly, President Ford and his 
successors did not envision that by signing the executive order they 
agreed that the United States was prohibited from acting in self-
defense against a foreign enemy who had already attacked the 
country.  The executive order exists to prevent the killing of 
foreign political leaders like Fidel Castro, not terrorist leaders.  The 
intent of the drafters was that the order applied during times of 
peace when the United States was not engaged in hostilities that 
had been authorized by Congress or in accordance with the 
international legal right of self-defense.
56
  
 
C. Congressional Action Related to U.S. Drones Program 
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 Exec. Order 12333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59954 (Dec. 4, 1981). 
53
 Exec. Order 11905 was superseded by Exec. Order 12036, 43 Fed. Reg. 
3674 (President Jimmy Carter, Jan. 26, 1978). 
54
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Under U.S. domestic law, the use of drones targeted against 
those terrorists that conducted the 9/11 attacks and those that 
harbor or support those individuals has authorization in the form of 
the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force (“AUMF”) 
which continues to be effective, controlling legal authority.
57
  The 
preamble of the AUMF invokes the right of self-defense and 
authorized the President to  
 
use all necessary and appropriate force against those 
nations, organizations, or persons he determines 
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the 
terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 
2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in 
order to prevent any further acts of international 
terrorism against the United States by such nations, 
organizations, or persons.
58
 
 
The AUMF authorized the U.S. President to use force against all 
those involved in the attacks on 9/11, whether they were the 
leaders of Al Qaeda or mere foot soldiers, foreign officials or 
private individuals. Under the president’s constitutional authorities, 
he has the authority to determine which agency of the United 
States Government would be the most appropriate in using force to 
stop those that conducted 9/11.  It is up to the president to 
determine whether the DoD or the CIA is best equipped to carry 
the mission out.  In fact, both DoD and CIA have been critical to 
the drone program and stopping the terrorists from being able to 
carry out further attacks. 
 
The limiting authority of the AUMF, however, derives 
from the nexus between the September 11, 2001 attacks against the 
U.S. and the involvement of the target for lethal killings with those 
attacks against the United States.  If the nexus exists, then the 
AUMF would authorize the action against the target.  For those 
terrorists like al-Awlaki who are members of Al Qaeda in the 
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Arabian Pennisula (“AQAP”), the Haqqani Network in Pakistan or 
the Pakistan Taliban who have been killed by the drones, but who 
were not directly involved with the attacks of 9/11, the AUMF 
does not cover them explicitly.  However, under a co-belligerency 
theory, members of other terrorists groups like AQAP that have 
made a common cause with Al Qaeda and have become “a part of 
Al Qaeda— or at a minimum an organized, associated force or co-
belligerent of Al Qaeda—in the non-international armed conflict 
between the United States and Al Qaeda.”59  In February 2012, Jeh 
Johnson, DoD General Counsel, in a speech at Yale Law School, 
discussed the AUMF.  He noted that although the AUMF does not 
contain geographic limitations, the Obama Administration does not 
consider the current hostilities against the terrorists that threaten 
the United States to be a “global” war without limits.  He also 
noted that, in his opinion, the decisions related to who is targeted 
in these hostilities is a core function of the Executive Branch and is 
unreviewable by the courts.
60
  Arguably, even without specific 
congressional approval such as the AUMF, the U.S. President 
would have the legal authority to use drones against specific 
targets since these strikes do not involve participation in 
“hostilities” as understood by the War Powers Resolution.61 
 
III. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Increasingly, the practice of international affairs is less 
State-centered, while international law remains very much so.  
Most international law pronouncements remain almost exclusively 
directed to States as well as its implementation mechanisms. While 
international law has long recognized the role of States in inter-
                                                        
59
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state force and the laws related to the use of force between States, 
it has been slow to develop in the area of force by non-state actors.  
For decades prior to 9/11, States faced the rising threat from non-
state terrorist actors.  The U.S. was one of a number of States that 
had been the target of terrorists, suffering attacks against its 
embassies, civilians, military personnel and its territory.  As the 
United Nations (“UN”) recognized in its high-level panel report in 
2004, the “norms governing the use of force by non-state actors 
have not kept pace with those pertaining to States.” 62 As the report 
pleaded, the “United Nations must achieve the same degree of 
normative strength concerning non-state use of force as it has 
concerning State use of force.”63  
 
In a world where non-state actors, terrorists, can hide 
within the sovereign territory of a State and launch attacks against 
other States, States currently lack effective international legal 
guidance from the UN as to what should inform their decisions to 
use force under the circumstances.  There are, however, established 
principles based in international law that can and should guide the 
international community as all States seek to minimize the use of 
force while providing security for all from terrorists.  To deprive 
States of the legal authority to act to stop and prevent terrorists 
from acting would undermine the law of the Charter and the 
international order established in the wake of world war.  The UN 
Charter was not drafted to leave states vulnerable to attack without 
any recourse to defense. 
    
Some have argued that the United States should be using 
law enforcement methods to deal with Al Qaeda members in other 
territories.  What these critics miss, however, is that the threat from 
Al Qaeda is not the same as law enforcement threats.  In the past 
the U.S. position was to generally treat acts of violence by 
terrorists like other criminals and use law enforcements measure 
against the individuals.  For example, following the attacks by Al 
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Qaeda on the World Trade Center in 1993, U.S. embassies in East 
Africa in 1998, and the U.S.S. Cole in 2000, the United States used 
criminal law and law enforcement measures to investigate, 
extradite, and prosecute the persons responsible for the attacks.  
The United States also, however, used military force and 
intelligence measures to counter the terrorist threat during the same 
time, maintaining the right of the United States to defend itself 
against attacks from terrorists.  For example, after Libyan agents 
bombed a Berlin disco where American service personnel 
frequented, the United States bombed the residence of the Libyan 
leader, Gaddafi, in addition to other military and intelligence 
targets.  The United States argued that the attacks by Libyan agents 
led to a right to use force in self-defense under Article 51 of the 
UN Charter.
64
   
 
In 1998, after the attacks against the U.S. embassies in 
Kenya and Tanzania, in addition sending the FBI to East Africa to 
investigate the attack, the United States bombed Al Qaeda training 
camps in Afghanistan and a nerve gas manufacturing facility with 
ties to Osama Bin Laden in Sudan.  These instances, however, can 
be distinguished from the current conflict that the United States is 
engaged in against terrorists.  The terrorists in these cases were 
localized and their level of violence was contained.  Therefore, a 
military response to such actions was limited to a specific a 
discrete use of force in self-defense to eliminate the assets in the 
locations that they were using to carry out attacks against the 
United States.  The violence at issue, then, was not articulated as 
reaching the level of an armed conflict with these groups.  
However, today, the terrorists continue to pose a threat with the 
ability to create great violence against the United States as they 
move across various national boarders.   
                                                        
64
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The Sixth Annual Waldemar A. Solf Lecture in International Law: Terrorism, 
the Law, and National Defense, 126 MIL. L. REV. 89, 104, 120 (1989) 
(discussing Gaddafi as a legitimate target, noting that because he was 
responsible for “Libya’s policy of training, assisting and utilizing terrorists in 
attacks on U.S. citizens . . . he had no legal immunity from being attacked when 
present at a proper military target”). 
                 TARGETED KILLINGS BY DRONES:                        43 
A DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
For criminals such as drug lords, human traffickers, arms 
dealers, money launderers, the United States uses criminal law 
enforcement measures and the international criminal legal regime, 
working with other States, to stop such criminals.  Al Qaeda, as the 
UN recognized, poses a threat that is significantly different in 
scope and scale from criminals.  The attacks that Al Qaeda deploy 
are of such large scale and continuity that they are distinguishable 
from sporadic murders by criminals or low-level armed incursions 
or border incidents.  The stated goal of Al Qaeda is to commit 
massive casualties specifically among a State’s civilian population.  
Success for Al Qaeda does not come from low-level attacks but 
from high profile attacks with large death counts and great 
visibility.  While Al Qaeda and other terrorists groups do commit 
crimes to facilitate their terrorist activities (e.g., money laundering, 
drug trafficking, arms dealing), the reason the United States uses 
military force in self-defense against such groups is not because of 
their criminal activity but for their actions that threaten the very 
viability of States—high-level attacks of mass murder.  The 
legally-appropriate response in self-defense against the threats 
from Al Qaeda is the use of force narrowly targeting the members 
of Al Qaeda who pose the threat.  As long as Al Qaeda has the 
intent and capabilities to carry out attacks similar in nature to the 
9/11 attacks, the threats persists and the right of self-defense 
remains.   
 
A. The Use of Inter-state Force in Self-defense: Jus ad Bellum 
 
Targeted killings conducted in the territory of other States 
raise sovereignty issues.  Under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, 
States are forbidden from using force in the territory of another 
State.  When a State conducts a targeted killing in the territory of 
another State with which it is not in armed conflict the questions of 
whether the first State violates the sovereignty of the second State 
is raised.  The answer is based on the law applicable to the use of 
inter-state force.  In other words, in conducting the targeted killing, 
did the State have the legal authority under the UN Charter to 
violate the article 2(4) prohibition on the use of force within 
another State?  The legality of the targeted killing will depend on 
the rules related to international humanitarian law. 
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 Under international law, a targeted killing conducted by 
one State in the territory of a second State does not violate the 
second State’s sovereignty if (1) the second State consents, (2) the 
UN Security Council authorizes the targeted killing under Chapter 
VII, Article 42 of the UN Charter, or (3) if the first State has the 
right under international law to use force in self-defense under 
Article 51 of the UN Charter.  Article 51 states that a State can use 
force in another State’s territory, without violating that State’s 
sovereignty, if the first State has suffered an armed attack.  The 
UN Security Council has supported two circumstances under 
which the first State has such authority under Article 51: (1) where 
the second State is responsible for an armed attack against the first 
State,
65
 or (2) if the second State is unwilling or unable to stop 
armed attacks against the first State launched from its territory.
66
   
 
 The “unwilling or unable” test is less developed under 
international law and will likely need more development before it 
is fully accepted by States.  Some have argued that the right to 
intervene in such cases where the State is unable or unwilling to 
stop the threat stems from the obligation of neutrality during wars 
between States.
67
  As the Caroline incident illustrated, even though 
Canada and the United States were not at war, the British argued 
that they were justified in using force in self-defense within the 
United States because the United States had been unable to uphold 
its responsibilities of a neutral State in preventing Americans from 
interfering in Canadian matters (i.e., Americans joining the rebels 
fighting against the Canadians and using an American ship to 
supply the rebels).
68
  This issue will be examined more closely 
below.  However, during a time of peace, where an incursion or 
threat does not amount to an “armed attack” the right may be an 
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extension of the concept of the norm of State responsibility to 
prevent harm from emanating from its territory and harming 
another State. 
 
 As long as the force used is both necessary and 
proportionate, States can use lethal force in self-defense within the 
territory of another State in response to an armed attack.
69
  
According to the principle of necessity, the State acting in self-
defense must only use force when it has deemed that no other non-
lethal means exist to resolve the threat.  Proportionality under jus 
ad bellum requires that any response to an armed attack be 
calibrated to stop the original attack or prevent future attacks.  
Although no strict force-to-force ratio is required, in determining 
how the response is proportionate to the original attack the 
following factors should be considered: the scale of the response, 
the targets chosen, type and degree of force employed, and the 
results to be achieved.  In responding to non-state actors who have 
committed an attack in another territory, a responding State would 
be limited to acts in self-defense targeted against the terrorist 
targets as contrasted to the infrastructure, facilities, and leadership 
of the territorial State, unless there was proof of the State’s 
complicity in the terrorists attacks.
70
  
 
1. Consent 
 
It is clear under international law that if a State invites or 
consents to another State’s using force within its territory, there is 
no violation of the State’s sovereignty or Article 2(4) of the UN 
Charter.  This is a well-established exception to the Article 2(4) 
prohibition.  As far as drone strikes in Pakistan and Yemen are 
concerned, based upon public reports, it is likely that those States 
did provide consent to the United States to conduct targeted 
killings within their territories.  However, international law still 
places limits upon what can be done against specific individuals 
within a State’s territory since the host State itself is limited under 
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international humanitarian law or human rights law as to what it 
can do vis-a-vis individuals within its territory.  Under a law 
enforcement framework, controlled by human rights law, a State 
cannot target to kill individuals in its own territory unless there is 
no other way to avert a great danger.  If, however, the host State is 
unable to detain and arrest the individual, preventing the person 
from posing a threat against the other State by planning and taking 
part in terrorist attacks, the host State may legally consent to the 
other State using force within its territory to stop the threat. 
 
2. Right of Self-defense Against Non-state Actors 
 
In the absence of consent by the host State, the first State 
can legally use force within the host State against specific terrorists 
based on the principle of self-defense.
71
  As noted previously, 
according to the UN Charter and the International Court of Justice 
(“ICJ”), international law permits the use of lethal force in self-
defense in response to an “armed attack” as long as that force is 
necessary and proportionate.  There has been disagreement, 
however, as to whether the right of self-defense applies to the use 
of force against non-state actors and, related, whether the principle 
of self-defense alone can justify targeted killings. 
 
 The United States’ use of force in Afghanistan after 9/11 
was based on the international legal principle of self-defense.  The 
principle of state responsibility also played a role in the U.S. 
response against Al Qaeda, the perpetrators of the attacks, in the 
sovereign State of Afghanistan, where the Taliban was tied to the 
acts of Al Qaeda and had been at least unable, if not unwilling, to 
stop Al Qaeda from operating within its territory against the United 
States.  This right of self-defense stems from the customary legal 
“inherent” right of all States to act in self-defense in the face of 
significant threats.  The resort to legal force by the United States 
after 9/11 targeting Al Qaeda was based on the right of self-
defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter.  Article 51 permits the 
use of lethal force on the territory of another State if that State is 
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responsible for an armed attack.  It has been a matter of debate 
whether Article 51 permits States to use force against non-state 
actors who committed “armed attacks” against the State.   
 
 The ICJ in the Wall opinion and the Nicaragua case lends 
support to the argument that States cannot invoke Article 51 
against armed attacks by non-state actors that are not imputable to 
the State.  The ICJ has ruled that force used in self-defense may 
only be carried out on the territory of a State responsible for a 
significant armed attack if that State ordered the attack or controls 
the group that carried it out.
72
  The United States has argued that 
Article 51 was not intended to replace the pre-existing customary 
international right to act in self-defense, including against non-
state actors.  In fact, State practice supports this argument.  The 
Caroline incident of 1837 reflects the customary international right 
to act in self-defense that existed prior to the UN Charter and, most 
experts argue, continues to exist post-UN Charter. 
 
3. The Caroline Incident Revisited 
 
It was the Caroline case that changed the concept of self-
defense from what had been previously considered to be a political 
excuse to what has since been accepted as a legal doctrine under 
international law.  In 1837, Canada was deeply immersed in a 
rebellion.  The U.S. government did not support the rebels and had 
maintained that it had been trying to take steps to maintain order 
along the border with Canada and restrain American cooperation 
with the rebels.  The efforts by the U.S. government, however, 
failed to stop hundreds of Americans from joining the rebels.  The 
specific facts of the Caroline case are particularly relevant to 
today’s current conflict between the United States and terrorists 
and the legal justifications offered by the United States. 
 
 On December 13, 1837, an armed group, composed mainly 
of Americans citizens, invaded Canadian territory and took 
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possession of Navy Island, a British “possession.”73  An American 
named Van Rausselear, led the group.  From December 13 to 29, 
1837, the group maintained control of Navy Island, committing 
“acts of Warlike aggression on the Canadian shore, and also on 
British Boats passing the Island.”74  On December 29, 1837, the 
Caroline, an American private ship, traveled from Buffalo, New 
York, to Navy Island, transporting men and “stores of war.”  On 
December 29, 1837, a British force destroyed the Caroline, 
seeking to stop the supply of men and supplies to the rebels and 
preventing the Americans their access to the mainland of Canada.  
At midnight of that evening, the British moved into U.S. territory 
as it attacked the ship, killing two Americans, destroying the ship, 
and arresting two individuals (one an American citizen).  Prior to 
the attack against the Caroline, the U.S. officials were aware that 
Americans were actively participating in the rebellion against the 
Canadians.  The United States, however, had not arrested any 
Americans nor had the United States agreed to extradite anyone to 
Canada to be tried for their actions.  
 
 On January 5, 1838, Secretary of State Forsyth wrote a 
letter of protest to Mr. Fox, the British Minister at Washington.  
Mr. Fox replied.  He described the nature of the Caroline as 
“piratical” and invoked the “necessity of self-defense and self-
preservation” as justification for the destruction of the Caroline.  
Notably, the British maintained in the letter that because the 
United States had failed to enforce its own laws preventing the 
Americans from joining the rebels and attacking Canada, the 
British were justified in destroying the Caroline.  The ship had 
acted as a belligerent, forfeiting any privileges of neutral territory.  
As to the British claim that the United States failed to enforce its 
laws, there were facts supporting the claim.  In a letter to the 
president from the Mayor of Buffalo, the mayor wrote, “The civil 
authorities have no adequate force to control these men, and unless 
the General Government should interfere, there is no way to 
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prevent serous disturbances.”75  The U.S. government did not send 
any armed reinforcements to the border.   
 
 The United States and the British agreed that there was a 
right to intervene into the territory of another State to stop and 
prevent non-state actors from doing harm within the other territory 
when necessary under the circumstances.  The difference between 
them, however, was over the claim by the British that the United 
States was either unable or unwilling to stop the rebels within its 
territory from attacking Canada.  In their correspondence, the 
ministers from Britain seemed to indicate that they thought that 
this fact alone was sufficient to justify the destruction of the 
Caroline.  The United States insisted that it was adequately 
fulfilling its obligation to prevent the rebels from attacking Canada 
from U.S. territory.  The facts revealed that the United States had 
inadequately addressed the issue, as attacks into Canada from U.S. 
territory continued throughout 1838.   
 
 It was not until 1841 when the then-Secretary of State 
Daniel Webster wrote his famous letter to the British Minister Fox 
containing the famous words justifying the destruction of Caroline 
on “self-defence and self-preservation.”  Webster called on the 
British Government to show a “necessity of self-defence, instant, 
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for 
deliberation.”  Webster went on to state that even if necessity 
required the British to enter U.S. territory, they still needed to 
show how their actions were not “unreasonable or excessive.”  
Lord Ashburton, in his reply to Webster, fitting the facts into the 
framework that Webster had developed, argued that because the 
insurgent forces were organized in U.S. territory without effective 
steps taken by the U.S. authorities to prevent them, it became 
necessary to acquire the Caroline.  Accordingly, if the State had 
been willing and able to take steps to stop the threat, the State 
acting in self-defense would have to show the necessity of acting 
quickly under the circumstances.  But if a State was not taking any 
steps to stop the threat, the State acting in self-defense was 
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justified in using force in the other State’s territory as long as the 
actions in self-defense were proportionate to the threat. 
  
 According to the British, who believed that the United 
States had been unwilling or unable to stop the attacks from U.S. 
territory, the United States had failed to maintain a neutral and 
peaceful status.
76
  In the view of the British, the British action 
within U.S. territory was necessary because the United States was 
not able or willing to stop the attacks.  Therefore, there were not 
any other measures that could have been taken in order to stop the 
Caroline from providing the supplies to the rebels because the 
United States has already proved unable stop these activities on the 
border.   
 
 The U.S. position, on the other hand, articulated by 
Webster’s formulation for determining the legality of self-defense, 
was based on his assumption that the attack was unnecessary 
because the United States was both willing able to satisfy its 
obligations to prevent and punish attacks from within its borders.  
Based on Webster’s assumption that the United States would be 
able to stop the attacks, the British would have authority to use 
force within U.S. territory against the rebels if the need to act was 
“instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no 
moment for deliberation.”  In effect, Webster was arguing that the 
British should have relied on the U.S. government to take action 
against the rebels within U.S. territory.  On the assumption that the 
United States would and could stop the attacks from the rebels, the 
threat posed by the Caroline was not so imminent that it required 
the British to violate U.S. territory.   
 
 The Caroline incident, in full context and with a closer 
look at the facts, makes clear that Webster’s rule was meant to 
apply to situations in which the State on whose territory the self-
defense action is contemplated is not responsible for the threat 
involved and is both able and willing to act appropriately to 
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prevent the threat from being realized.  In other words, the threat 
must be “instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and 
no moment of deliberation” before using force when the State is 
able or willing to act to prevent the threat.  Therefore, if the State 
ably and willingly can take action against the threat, the State 
contemplating using force would need to meet the higher threshold 
of immediacy before taking such action under the circumstances.  
The Caroline incident provides support for the argument that a 
State can act in self-defense within the territory of another State 
against non-State actors under certain circumstances.  If the host 
State is unable or unwilling to prevent the attacks from the non-
state actors then the first State acting in self-defense can use force 
without having to meet the high threshold of a State of imminence.  
    
 Further support for the argument that States can use force 
in self-defense against non-State actors is based on UN Security 
Council (“UNSC”) resolutions 1368 and 1373, issued after 9/11 
and NATO’s invocation of its Article 5 collective self-defense 
provision in the wake of those attacks.  In the weeks after 9/11, in 
Resolution 1368, the UN Security Council recognized the 9/11 
attacks as a major attack against a State and authorized the use of 
lethal force against those responsible for the attacks.  In the 
resolution, however, the Security Council did not specify or limit 
the particular location or State in which the United States could 
legally use force in self-defense.  Based on the Security Council 
action and Article 51 authority, the United States had the legal 
authority to use lethal force in the territory of another State against 
the non-state actors who carried out the attacks on 9/11.   
 
 Even before the UNSC authorized this action, the United 
States arguably had this “inherent” right under Article 51. But 
certainly once the UNSC authorized a military response, there was 
no doubt in the international community of the legal right of the 
United States to use military force to stop the non-state actors who 
conducted the attacks against the United States.  Certainly, not 
every wrongful act against a State will rise to the level of an armed 
attack.  But as long as the high threshold for an armed attack as set 
forth by the Nicaragua case, “the most grave uses of forces,” is 
met, then States have that right to use self-defense.  Particularly 
with terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda, with their global reach and 
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support systems, these non-state actors may continue, without 
engaging the responsibility of a host State, to conduct the kind of 
armed attack that gives rise to the right to use force.  As the 
Caroline criteria pointed out, if a State is unwilling or unable to 
stop terrorists from within its territory from carrying out armed 
attacks against another States, the victim State has the legal 
authority to use force within the host State against the terrorists, 
but not the government.  As long as terrorists groups continue to 
actively plan and carry out attacks, the United States and other 
States maintain the legal right to use lethal force in self-defense 
against those groups, wherever they be.  Furthermore, the right of 
self-defense is a continuing self-defense right as distinguished 
from an anticipatory self-defense right.
77
  
 
4. The Threshold for Armed Attack by Non-state Actors 
 
The ICJ has established a high threshold for the kinds of 
attacks that would justify the use of force in self-defense in another 
State’s territory.  According to the ICJ, sporadic, low-intensity 
attacks do not rise to the level of armed attack that would permit 
the right to use such force in self-defense.  Some commentators 
have argued that in assessing the legality of the self-defense force 
in light of the gravity of the attack, the force used must be judged 
in light of each armed attack, looked at individually, rather than 
considering the aggregation of the successive armed attacks.  
However, the U.S. use of the targeted killings is based on an 
assessment of the ongoing and continuous threat from these actors 
who are part of groups that are actively planning to carry out 
devastating attacks against the United States and U.S. interests 
abroad.  
 
 Some have argued that the right of self-defense from an 
armed attack does not last indefinitely, allowing a State to continue 
endlessly to use force, but the right must stop at some point after 
the armed attack.  However, what if the State suffered from 
continuous, ongoing attacks, separated by some time but that are 
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still being planned by the adversary?  One can argue that after 
9/11, the United States had the legal authority to use force in self-
defense after the armed attack against its territory.  And as argued 
above, one can argue that that right extended to using force in 
another State’s territory if that State was unable or unwilling to 
stop that attacks from its territory.  Even if a jus ad bellum analysis 
offers a justification for a targeted killing, it does not dispose of the 
further question of whether the killing of the particular individual 
is lawful.  This question is answered by addressing the 
requirements of international humanitarian law (“IHL”) during 
armed conflict.  
 
 Whether recourse to the use of force is legal is a question 
that arises at the start of a conflict.  To assess the legality of that 
initial use of force, one turns to the UN Charter in analyzing 
whether the use of force violated Article 2(4), whether the use of 
force falls below the threshold of Article 2(4), and whether the use 
of force triggered the Article 51 threshold for an “armed attack.”  
This body of law is referred to as jus ad bellum.  Even if a State 
has the right to respond using lethal force in self-defense under 
Article 51, however, there are limits to what a State can do in self-
defense.  The general principle of necessity requires that a State 
show that the use of military force is a last resort and can 
accomplish a defensive purpose.  In territories where the terrorists 
are planning their attacks, where the host State cannot effectively 
stop them, military force may be the last resort.   
 
 The principle of necessity requires that states use military 
force as a last resort and in doing so can accomplish their defensive 
purpose.  Prior to the 9/11 attacks, the United States, in 
cooperation with dozens of states, tried to stop and prevent terrorist 
attacks from Al Qaeda through law enforcement measures.  At the 
time, that was probably the most appropriate measure to take.  
(Although one can dispute whether after the embassy bombings in 
1998 or the attack against the U.S.S. Cole these measures should 
have been subject to more doubt in their effectiveness to deal with 
the terrorist threat from Al Qaeda).  For decades, the United States 
had worked with the criminal courts and partner law enforcement 
agencies domestically and across the globe to obtain arrest 
warrants for terrorists to seek trying them for their crimes.  The 
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hope was that such measures would take the most dangerous 
terrorists off the street and prevent the terrorists from conducting 
significant attacks.   
 
 After 9/11, the international community supported the U.S. 
use of military force against Al Qaeda in recognition of the fact 
that military force was necessary to deter the terrorist threat and 
that the law enforcement approach that had been used prior to 9/11 
in the face of attacks since the early 1990s from Al Qaeda were not 
effective.  Certainly, in authorizing such use of force, the UNSC 
believes that such use of force could accomplish the defensive 
purpose of preventing Al Qaeda from attacking again.  At least that 
was the goal.  The use of drones to kill members of Al Qaeda, 
taking them off the streets and rendering them unable to plan or 
carry out another attack, would satisfy the necessity requirement.  
Just as bombing Afghanistan fulfilled the requirement, so too does 
eliminating those members of Al Qaeda that would facilitate 
further attacks meet the necessity requirement under international 
law.  CIA Director Leon Panetta has stated that drones are “the 
only game in town in terms of confronting and trying to disrupt the 
Al Qaeda leadership.”78  According to Panetta, the person who 
authorizes the targeted killing of Al Qaeda members, this advanced 
technology may be the only means to stop Al Qaeda and prevent 
further attacks.   
 
 Some have criticized the use of drones, arguing that it is not 
an effective counterterrorism tool because at times innocent by-
standers are killed.
79
  While the likelihood of innocent people 
being killed in warfare is always a possibility, the fact that there 
are incidental deaths of civilians not posing a threat during a drone 
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strike does not make the use of strikes illegal.  As always with the 
use of force, the State must abide by the requirement that the use of 
force must be proportionate to the threat, causing as little death or 
damage to bystanders as possible to achieve the military objective.  
The decision to use any military weapon as a lawful use of force in 
self-defense must be weighed against the requirement to minimize 
the death of innocent civilians.  This decision is one that must be 
made by military and civilian leadership.   
 
 Others have argued that using drones does not stop 
terrorism.  However, if prior to 9/11, the United States had been 
able to eliminate any number of the hijackers through targeted 
killings, the 9/11 plot would have at a minimum delayed Al 
Qaeda’s plans for that day giving the U.S. government more time 
to uncover the plot.  Eliminating hijackers or some of the Al Qaeda 
leaders could have lead to Bin Laden deciding to give up the 
planned attack in total.  Eliminating Al Qaeda leaderships is 
arguably just as effective as eliminating some of the foot soldiers 
that carry out the details of a terrorism plan.  
  
 Under the proportionality requirement, lethal force may be 
used only to the extent necessary to achieve the military objective.  
Without the ability to arrest and remove terrorists from positions 
where they can plan more attacks, killing the leaders and other 
individuals critical to the terrorist operations would be appropriate.  
Some argue that the necessity and proportionality requirement 
rules of jus ad bellum provide an adequate legal framework for the 
use of force against the threat in any armed conflict with an 
adversary.
80
  Others, however, point out that if a State is presently 
in hostilities with an adversary, as the U.S. government has 
indicated it is with respect to Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups 
that are attacking or seek to attack the United States, then the laws 
of war are applicable during the existence of the hostilities.
81
  
Furthermore, if the United States is not in a state of hostilities with 
these actors, then the laws applicable to law enforcement 
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measures, human rights law, would be applicable in determining 
what individuals can legally be targeted.
82
  According to the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (“ICRC”), “international 
lawfulness of a particular operation involving the use of force may 
not always depend exclusively on IHL but, depending on the 
circumstances, may potentially be influenced by other applicable 
legal frameworks, such as human rights law and the jus ad 
bellum.”83 
 
B. Self-defense and International Humanitarian Law: Jus in Bello 
 
Once there is justification for using force under jus ad 
bellum, the law related to armed conflict, jus in bello, will dictate 
what rules the parties must abide by in waging their hostilities.  It 
is important to distinguish these two areas of international law.  
Under jus ad bellum, the reason for the use of force is important in 
assessing the legality of the actions.  In contrast, under 
international law, when determining whether an armed conflict 
exists, triggering international humanitarian law, the purpose of the 
armed forces in engaging in acts of violence is irrelevant to the 
determination of whether an armed conflict exists.  Under 
international law there are four categories of armed hostilities that 
can exist: (1) hostilities of a international armed conflict, (2) 
hostilities of a non-international armed conflict that meets the 
threshold of Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions, (3) 
hostilities of a non-international armed conflict meeting the 
threshold of Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions and 
Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions, or (4) hostilities 
that are isolated and sporadic which are not considered to reach the 
level of “armed conflict.”84   
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 An international armed conflict exists between two States 
involving armed forces.
85
  When the Geneva Conventions were 
drafted, it was common for States to declare wars against each 
other.  At that point, the rules related to armed conflict would be 
triggered irrespective of the level of hostilities because it was clear 
that States were involved with armed forces in conflict.  Following 
the definition of an international armed conflict in Article 2(1) of 
the Geneva Conventions, an international armed conflict cannot 
exist between a State and a non-state armed group.  Therefore, the 
U.S. conflict with Al Qaeda and affiliated terrorists groups would 
not constitute an international armed conflict. 
 
 The fourth category of hostilities, those that do not rise to 
the level of armed conflict, can be ruled out in the context of the 
current U.S. conflict with Al Qaeda and others.  As will be 
discussed, the level of violence produced by Al Qaeda and other 
terrorist groups working with Al Qaeda surpasses any isolated and 
sporadic incidents of violence.  Al Qaeda and those groups that 
have joined Al Qaeda in continuing its mission of killing 
Americans are not isolated but, rather, are part of an ongoing effort 
to destroy America.  As for categories 2 and 3, the United States is 
not party to Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions and, 
therefore, category 2 is the relevant category of hostilities for 
analysis to determine whether the current conflict meets the 
threshold of a non-international armed conflict, thereby informing 
the parties what specific rules are applicable for the duration of 
hostilities.  The challenges lies in the fact that Common Article 3 
does not define “armed conflict,” “organization of an armed 
group,” nor does it provide any indication of the degree of intensity 
required for a situation to qualify as “armed conflict not of an 
international character.” 
  
 In March 2012, in a speech at the American Society of 
International Law, Harold Koh, State Department Legal Advisor, 
discussed the legal justification for the Obama Administration’s 
drone program.  In his speech, Koh acknowledged that self-defense 
is one legal basis for drone strikes but also mentioned that 
                                                        
85
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international humanitarian law is an additional basis, stating that 
the United States is “in an armed conflict with Al Qaeda, as well as 
the Taliban and associated forces.”86  Koh went on to describe how 
drone attacks would not take place in States that had effective law 
enforcement efforts against terrorists but only in those States that 
lacked such efforts or capabilities.  Based upon what Koh 
indicated, therefore, it is relevant to examine how the U.S. drone 
program is or is not complying with the rules related to 
international humanitarian law (“IHL”). The most central question 
related to the drone program under IHL is whether under the 
program the killing of individuals is arbitrary, which is prohibited 
under the rules.  Even the former Special Rapporteur on 
Extrajudicial Killing, Summary on Arbitrary Executions noted that 
targeted killings may be lawful in the context of IHL: “[A]though 
in most circumstances targeted killings violate the right to life, in 
the exceptional circumstances of armed conflict, they may be 
legal.” 87 This conclusion illustrates the importance of answering 
the question of the applicability of IHL and the existence of an 
armed conflict. 
 
 During an armed conflict, the law regulating the conduct of 
military operations during war applies.  This law is often referred 
to as the “law of war,” the “law of armed conflict,” or jus in bello.  
Under the Geneva Conventions, the definition of “armed conflict” 
is abstract; therefore, whether or not a situation can be described as 
an “armed conflict,” meeting the criteria of Common Article 3, is 
to be decided on a case-by-case basis based on the facts of the 
situation.  These laws are distinguishable from those related to the 
recourse to the use of force, jus ad bellum, as discussed above.  
The rules would appear to be quite straight forward given the 
specific area of conflict.  However, there is much debate about the 
scope and nature of the actual armed conflict that the United States 
is currently engaged in with terrorists.   
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 Harold Koh, Legal Advisor, Department of State, Keynote Address at 
the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law: The Obama 
Administration and International Law (Mar. 25, 2010). 
87
 Alston, supra note 1, at 12. 
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 The nature of the specific conflict is important since there 
is a difference in the rules that apply in an international armed 
conflict as distinguished from a non-international armed conflict, 
particularly as it relates to targeting civilians.  Historically, States 
have dealt with non-state actors as internal conflicts (matters to be 
dealt with under domestic law), human rights law issues, and law 
enforcement matters.  Therefore, the international law for non-
international armed conflicts is far less developed than the law 
applicable to conflicts between States that crosses international 
boundaries.  However, no matter the nature of the conflict, the 
intent of the drafters of the Geneva Conventions was that there 
would always be protections for the victims when any type of 
conflict is occurring.  The ICJ has posited that the substantive 
provisions of Common Article 3 reflect fundamental 
considerations of humanity that are binding regardless of the 
character of an armed conflict.  Accordingly, Common Article 3 
applies whether it is an international or non-international armed 
conflict.  Therefore, even if the conflict spills over into another 
State’s territory and becomes transnational, as is the conflict 
between the United States and Al Qaeda and its affiliates, 
Common Article 3 is applicable. 
 
1.  Non-International Armed Conflict 
 
The United States has stated that it is in a non-international, 
armed conflict with Al Qaeda.  In other words, the U.S. drone 
program operates under the laws of war against targets that are 
engaged in hostilities against the United States.  Therefore, the 
targeted killings are not considered “extrajudicial killings”88 or 
“assassinations” because peacetime rules prohibiting such killings 
are not applicable.  The use of such force to kill terrorists by 
drones is implemented in sovereign territories of other States only 
if those States are unable or unwilling to stop the threat posed by 
                                                        
88
 Under U.S. law, “extrajudicial killing” is defined under the Torture 
Victims Protection Act as “a deliberated killing not authorized by a previous 
judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial 
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.  Such 
term, however, does not include any such killing that, under international law, is 
lawfully carried out under the authority of a foreign nation.” 28 U.S.C. § 1350. 
60     ST. JOHN’S JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL [Vol. 3 No. 1 
                          & COMPARATIVE LAW 
 
the individuals.  In circumstances where the sovereignty of other 
States is concerned with targeted killings, international law 
regarding the resort to force, jus ad bellum, as discussed above, can 
serve to resolve the issues. 
 
 Common Article 3 provides that in “armed conflicts not of 
an international character,” each party to the conflict shall observe 
certain minimum standards.  In other words, there are certain 
prohibitions that must be honored by the parties to the conflict: 
prohibitions on murder, torture, other ill-treatment, hostage-taking, 
and unfair trial.  As such, Common Article 3 provides rules on the 
protection of persons in enemy hands, but it does not include 
specific rules on the conduct of hostilities.  
  
 Although the Geneva Conventions do not define the terms 
“non-international armed conflict,” under treaty, customary 
international law, and international court decisions, there are 
specific criteria one can point to in determining the existence of a 
non-international armed conflict between a State and non-state 
armed groups.  The determination is premised on two factors: the 
scale or intensity of the violence and the degree of organization of 
the parties.
89
  As noted by Idi Gaparayi, the Associate Legal 
Officer at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (“ICTY”), “[d]etermining what counts as ‘protracted’ 
armed violence and as a ‘well-organized’ armed group requires a 
case-specific analysis of the facts.”90  This is a determination that 
must be made on a case-by-case basis given the facts at the time.  
                                                        
89
 Judgment of Trial Chamber (Prosecutor v. Boskoski), I.C.T.J. IT-04-82-
T at 173–86 (July 10, 2008).  Under the Geneva Conventions and the Additional 
Protocols these criteria include: (1) a level of organization of the non-state group 
such that the State is able to identify the members of the group; (2) engagement 
of the non-state group in collective, armed action against the State; (3) 
admission of the conflict to the UN Security Council; (4) the violence caused by 
the non-state group goes beyond “internal disturbances and tensions, such as 
riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence”; (4) the violence is “protracted 
armed violence” or if an isolated incident, one with a high degree of intensity; 
and (5) the confines of the battlefield can be a transnational conflict that crosses 
State borders. 
90
 See ANTHONY CULLEN, THE CONCEPT OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED 
CONFLICT IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 123 (2010). 
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Each party is under a good faith obligation to assess whether the 
facts are such that, objectively, one can conclude that the conflict 
is of a non-international character.  
 
 In 1995, in the Tadic case, the Appeal Chamber for the 
ICTY provided a definition of non-international armed conflict: 
“[A]n armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed 
force between States or protracted armed violence between 
governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between 
such groups within a State.”91  In addressing the issue of whether 
the court had jurisdiction to try Tadic, a Bosian Serb, for crimes 
against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and 
violations of the customs of war under Articles 2, 3 and 5 of the 
ICTY Statute, the court needed to determine whether an armed 
conflict existed at the time between the parties.   
 The court in the Tadic judgment determined that there was 
an armed conflict of a non-international characteristic.  Although 
the definition is broader in scope than what was considered by the 
drafters of the Geneva Conventions, today it serves as an 
authoritative threshold for armed conflict associated with Common 
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.  This definition has been 
applied by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(“ICTR”) and adopted in the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (“ICC”), illustrating the definition’s widespread 
international legal authority.  In recognizing that the elements of a 
                                                        
91
 Although the definition was dictum in the case, it can still be considered 
persuasive especially given its consistent application by the ICTY, the ICTR, the 
ICJ, the ICC, and the Special Court for Sierra Leone. See Trial Chamber 
Judgment (Prosecutor v. Delalic, Mucic, Delic and Landzo), 1998 I.C.T.Y. No. 
IT-96-21-T, 183 (Nov. 16); Trial Chamber Judgment (Prosecutor v. Kordic and 
Cerkez), 2001 I.C.T.Y. No. IT-95-14/2-T, 24 (Feb. 26); Third Chamber 
Decision on Motion for Judgment of Acquittal (Prosecutor v. Slobodan 
Milosevic), 2004 I.C.T.Y. No. IT-02-54-T, 16 (June 16); Trial Chamber 
Judgment (Prosecutor v. Rutaganda), 1999 I.C.T.R. No. ICTR-96-3, 92 (Dec. 6); 
Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. 
Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 23 (Dec. 19) (separate opinion of Judge Simma); 
Decision on the Confirmation of Charges (Prosecutor v. Lubanga), 2007 I.C.C. 
No. ICC-01/04-01/06, 233 (Dec. 6); Decision on Appeal Against Decision on 
Prosecution’s Motion for Judicial Notice and Admission of Evidence, Appeals 
Chamber Decision of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (Prosecutor v. Fofana), 
¶ 32 May 16, 2005 (separate opinion of Justice Robertson). 
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non-international armed conflict existed, it triggered the 
application of international humanitarian law.  The application of 
the court’s criteria to the current U.S. conflict against non-state 
actor groups of terrorists is particularly relevant in assessing the 
nature of the conflict and applicable international humanitarian 
laws.  The next section follows the example of how the definition 
has been applied by the ICTY, developing a framework for the 
analysis of facts on a case-by-case basis that can be applied to the 
current U.S. conflict. 
 
2. Determining the Applicability of International 
Humanitarian Law 
 
In rendering a judgment on the merits, the Trial Chamber in 
Tadic explained that the purpose of the definition was to 
distinguish “an armed conflict from banditry, unorganized and 
short-lived insurrections, or terrorists activities, which are not 
subject to international humanitarian law.”92  In other words, for 
hostilities to amount to a non-international armed conflict, where 
Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions would be 
applicable, the level of hostilities would need to reach a certain 
level.  For those hostilities where the level of violence was low, 
such as with criminal activities, human rights law would be 
applicable and not humanitarian law.  In the Trial Chamber of the 
Delalic case, the ICTY supported this interpretation of a non-
international armed conflict and used the definition to distinguish 
between “cases of civil unrest or terrorist activities, the emphasis is 
on the protracted extent of the armed violence.”93  Importantly, the 
Kordic and Cerkez Appeals Chamber reiterated the significance of 
the two characteristics of the conflict and further explained what 
the court meant when it identified terrorist activities.  The court 
stated, “[T]he requirement of protracted fighting is significant in 
excluding mere cases of civil unrest or single acts of terrorism.”94   
 
                                                        
92
 Trial Chamber Judgment (Prosecutor v. Tadic), 1997 I.C.T.Y. No. IT-
94-1-AR72, 561 (May 7). 
93
 Delalic et al., supra note 97, at 184. 
94
 Appeals Chamber Judgment (Kordic and Cerkez), supra note 97, at ¶ 
341. 
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A. Organization of Parties 
 
According to the ICRC, “armed groups opposing a 
government must have a minimum degree of organization and 
discipline.”95  While the Tadic decision did not define what 
constitutes an “organized armed group,” subsequent case law 
provided some guidance on the meaning of the terms.  In the 
Milosevic trial, the court looked to the following elements in 
determining sufficient level of organization of the armed groups: 
official joint command structure, headquarters, designated zones of 
operation, and ability to procure, transport, and distribute arms.
96
  
Later in the Limaj trial, the court adopted the Tadic test and, 
following the Milosevic case, found that the Kosovo Liberation 
Army (“KLA”) was sufficiently organized due to the following 
factors: the role of the General Staff as the main governing body of 
the KLA carrying out such functions as appointing zone 
commanders, supplying weapons, issuing political statements, 
distributing regulations to members of the group, authorization to 
carry out specific hostile acts, and the assignment of tasks to 
individuals within the organization.
97
   
 
 Like the KLA, Al Qaeda has shown the ability to formulate 
and declare a change in operational tactics as well as dictating 
conditions for refraining from further hostile action.  This reflects 
how Al Qaeda continues to coordinate military planning and 
activities and to determine a unified military strategy.  The ability 
to do these things does not depend on having a hierarchical 
command structure.  As many have noted, Al Qaeda, post 9/11, has 
morphed into a more networked organizational structure.  
However, to meet the Tadic test, the command structure is not as 
relevant to this analysis as is the ability of the group to exhibit 
                                                        
95
 I.C.R.C., Armed Conflicts Linked to the Disintegration of State 
Structures: Preparatory Document Drafted by the International Committee of the 
Red Cross for the First Periodical Meeting on International Humanitarian Law, 
Geneva, Jan. 19–23, 1998.  
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 Trial Chamber Decision (Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic), supra note 
97, at ¶ 23. 
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 Judgment (Limaj et al.), 2007 I.C.T.Y. No. IT-03-66, ¶ 46–101 (Sept. 
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specific characteristics related to organizational stability, in 
whichever form that may be, that allow for operational 
effectiveness.   
 
 A certain level of effectiveness is indicative of a level of 
organization of the armed groups.  Al Qaeda and its affiliated 
groups have been successful in identifying the enemy to attack and 
laying out a plan to achieve that objective.  The leadership has 
been able to provide direction to its members as well as issuing 
public statements about its objectives.  Even when Bin Laden was 
in hiding, he used taped videos and couriers to deliver messages to 
his members and the general public.  As the court indentified in the 
Limaj case, the KLA had the ability to recruit, train, and equip new 
members; this was evidence of the group’s level of organization.98  
Even after the United States bombed Al Qaeda’s training camps in 
Afghanistan in 1998, Al Qaeda and its new members have been 
able to gain access to training in Pakistan.  After 9/11, plots 
thwarted through the arrest of suspects often revealed evidence that 
individuals had been to Pakistan to receive training from Al Qaeda.  
An additional indicator of Al Qaeda’s level of organization is that 
individual members of Al Qaeda that have been arrested or 
detained are in possession of weapons.   
 
 Al Qaeda is an organized, armed group capable of being a 
party to a conflict.  While Al Qaeda may be changing 
organizationally due to a process of decentralization, this does not 
diminish its ability to recruit, train, provide operational direction, 
affiliate funding of operations, and carry out armed attacks.  The 
United States is not targeting these groups solely because they are 
trafficking in drugs or humans, money laundering, counterfeiting, 
or arms trading.  These terrorist groups are not criminal gangs or 
drug cartels, although they may use criminal activities to finance 
their terrorist attacks.  It is significant that the United States is not 
using drone strikes to target criminals.  For those international 
criminals, the law enforcement framework under international law 
would be appropriate.  In fact, the United States applies the law 
enforcement framework under those circumstances.  However, for 
                                                        
98
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terrorists who are identifiable as a group and commit acts of 
violence with such intensity as 9/11, the United States 
appropriately employs the non-international armed conflict 
framework and the international humanitarian rules that are 
applicable. 
 
B. Intensity of Hostilities 
 
Similar to the organizational requirement, the threshold of 
“protracted armed violence” requires the interpretation of facts in 
the context of the U.S.-Al Qaeda conflict.  It is clear that the 
requisite level of intensity of hostilities for the existence of armed 
conflict must be above that of internal disturbances and tensions.  
On the other hand, it is also clear that the level of hostilities need 
not reach the magnitude of “sustained and concerted military 
operations.”  In determining the requisite level of intensity for 
hostilities to qualify as an armed conflict, the interpretation of the 
word “protracted” is central.  In the Limaj case, the court used a 
similar approach to the Milosevic case and relied on a number of 
factors in assessing the intensity of the violence: seriousness of 
armed clashes, mobilization of troops, kind of weaponry, 
destruction of property, and the existence of casualties.
99
   
 
 While “protracted” implies a time frame, it “does not carry 
the same meaning as ‘sustained’.”100  Therefore, “there is no 
requirement that military operations be carried out in a sustained or 
continuous manner.”101  The assessment of “protracted” hostilities 
is one that begins with the initiation of hostilities and continues to 
the end of the hostilities.  The Rome State of the ICC accepts the 
definition of non-international armed conflict and maintains that 
international humanitarian law applies even in situations of 
protracted armed violence where hostilities are not necessarily 
characterized as continuous, giving support to the argument that 
hostilities do not need to be “sustained and concerted” military 
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operations as Additional Protocol II dictates.  Just because there 
may be interruptions in fighting between parties does not mean that 
international humanitarian law ceases in being applicable.  In the 
case of Al Qaeda, as described before, the group has been engaged 
in hostilities against the United States since the early 1990s.  And 
while attacks have often been thwarted prior to and after 9/11, the 
group continues to maintain its mission to kill Americans and 
destroy the country.   
 
 The more difficult case here is in assessing the criteria of 
protracted violence as it related to several non-state parties 
involved in the conflict against the United States.  Central to the 
analysis is whether the hostilities originating from the several 
different non-state parties can be aggregated in considering 
whether hostilities are protracted.  This will depend on the 
relationship between the non-state parties.  Since 9/11 the United 
States successfully killed a number of Al Qaeda leaders and foot 
soldiers, arguably making it more difficult for the group to carry 
out its objectives.  What many terrorism experts have described is 
that Al Qaeda has partnered with other terrorist groups that can 
assist them in operating in different territories, sustaining their 
training, arming, and recruiting.  Although the groups may have 
different names and, for some, different goals, they join together in 
one common purpose: to fight and attack the United States.  These 
groups at times maintain their own command structure and merge 
together in a joint command style.  The attacks against the United 
States from Al Qaeda, the Taliban in Pakistan, AQAP, and others 
have not been disconnected, isolated, or sporadic acts of violence.  
Furthermore, the acts of violence by these other groups are tied to 
the conflict at issue with the United States.  The attacks are not 
about any other issue other than destroying the United States.  
They have been ongoing and connected through the common 
agenda and direction of the groups.  As noted above, the attacks do 
not have to be of a continuous nature.   
 
C. Standards Under International Humanitarian Law 
 
(i)  Level of Force to be Used 
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According to the ICRC, the IHL requirement related to the 
legitimate use of force is that the kind and amount of force used in 
a military operation be limited to that which is “actually necessary 
to accomplish a legitimate military purpose in the prevailing 
circumstances.”102  In circumstances where the State has control 
over the territory where a military operation is taking place, it may 
be feasible for the State to use less-than-lethal means to stop the 
civilian from causing violence to the State.  For example, the State 
could detain and arrest the individual.  This, however, is not a 
requirement under the law.  Under circumstances where a State 
determines that it could capture the individual instead of killing 
him, the State ought to use less lethal force in stopping the threat.  
In countries like Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia where the United 
States does not have a presence and the host State may not be able 
or willing to arrest the individual terrorists, IHL would permit the 
use of lethal force against the target as long as that person was a 
lawful target.   
 
(ii) Who are Lawful Targets and Where 
  
Common Article 3 does not provide any guidance on the 
rules related to the conduct of hostilities.  According to the ICRC, 
there are rules that would apply to non-international armed conflict 
related to the conduct of hostilities; they are rules that U.S. has 
accepted.  For example, parties to the conflict must distinguish 
between civilians and combatants.  Attacks cannot be directed at 
civilians but only combatants.  Civilian objects are protected from 
attack.  Further, the principle of proportionality would apply.  
 
 Members of organized armed forces or groups are 
legitimate targets.  These individuals are those whose continuous 
function is to conduct hostilities on behalf of a party to the armed 
conflict.  Civilians are not legitimate targets.  They are individuals 
who do not directly participate in hostilities or who does so on a 
merely spontaneous, sporadic, or unorganized basis.  Once a 
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Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian 
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civilian directly participated in hostilities, he then becomes a 
combatant and a legitimate target.  In non-international armed 
conflicts, all persons who are not members of State armed forces or 
organized armed groups of a party to the conflict are civilians and, 
therefore, are entitled to protections from direct attack until they 
forgo those protections by participating directly in the conflict.   
 In non-international armed conflicts, individual members of 
organized armed groups are people who have a continuous 
function to directly participate in the hostilities.  Therefore, the key 
terms for determining if members of Al Qaeda and other terrorist 
groups can be directly targeted is whether they have a continuous 
combat function.  The fact that an individual has a continuous 
combat function, however, does not provide any combat privileges 
to the individual.  This fact merely makes him a legitimate target.  
Importantly, however, for those individuals who are civilians and 
may have transitioned into combatants by directly participating in 
hostilities, but do so only on a spontaneous, sporadic or 
unorganized basis, or take on only non-combat functions, 
according to the ICRC, they are protected from direct attack.   
 
 In a non-international armed conflict, under humanitarian 
legal rules, States are permitted to attack those civilians who 
“directly participate in hostilities.”  The basis of this premise is that 
civilians lose their immunity from attack when they behave like 
combatants.  Yet, the law does not provide a definition for direct 
participation in hostilities.  Generally, the more similar a civilian’s 
actions are to those of a traditional fighter, the easier it becomes to 
argue that the civilian is participating in hostilities.  For example, 
civilians who shoot at the State forces or cause injury or death to 
State forces are generally treated as legitimate targets. 
 
 According to the ICRC Interpretive Guidance, the 
determination of what is considered direct participation in 
hostilities depends on whether the conduct at issue “constitute[s] 
an integral part of armed confrontations occurring between 
belligerents.”103  The ICRC sets forth a three-part test for 
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determining when an individual can be considered to be directly 
participating in hostilities.  This includes the consideration of the 
threshold of harm posed by his or her actions, the causal link 
between his or her actions and the potential harm to the opponent, 
and the nexus to the hostilities.  In addition to those involved in the 
physical attacks themselves, the ICRC also includes individuals 
who conduct preparatory activities of a specific act of direct 
participation in hostilities as well as any concluding activities 
related to the specific act, to include the return from the location of 
the actual act.  The central point is that all of these acts have a 
proximate casual to the specific act that reached the threshold of 
harm.  
 
 Significantly, according to the ICRC’s guidance on civilian 
status, civilians who do participate directly in hostilities (in other 
words, civilians who become combatants) and who have a 
“continuous combat function” can be targeted at all times and in all 
places, even when they are not directly participating in hostilities.  
The ICRC’s position on this is in line with the Tadic Appeals 
Chamber, which held that “the temporal and geographical scope of 
both internal and international armed conflicts extends beyond the 
exact time and place of hostilities.”104  This could include 
individuals who organize, equip, provide intelligence for, or 
otherwise direct the hostile activities of subordinates and 
collaborators on a continuous basis (i.e., acts qualifying under the 
threshold of harm, direct causation, and belligerent nexus criteria).  
These are the factors that are to be considered when individuals are 
placed on the target list.  However, civilians who become 
combatants because they directly participate in hostilities, but who 
do not have a “continuous combat function,” can only be targeted 
for the duration of each specific act that amounts to participating in 
direct hostilities.   
  
 Although the United States has not publicly discussed the 
factors that are considered for putting someone on a drone target 
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list, U.S. officials have discussed the identity of a number of the 
targets that have been killed.  Individuals who have been targeted 
and killed by drones have been described as members who had 
operational roles within Al Qaeda.  Membership and affiliation 
with such a group, directly supporting initiatives that seek to kill 
Americans and destroy the very way of life for Americans, has 
forced the United States and other States to change the methods 
used in defense of the State.  It is likely that the use of such 
methods will not be reversed; therefore, understanding how 
domestic and international laws work to incorporate and impose 
restrictions upon them is critically important for States using 
drones as well as the rest of the international community.   
 
 
 
